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Bridges and Bonds: the role of British merchant bank intermediaries in Latin American trade and finance networks, 1825-1850  
 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, transatlantic trade and finance networks were complex webs 
of transactions often consisting of lengthy chains of connections linking distant firms to distant 
markets. As a number of scholars have shown, merchant bankers of the nineteenth century were at the 
centre of many of these networks, acting as an inter-connected and often impenetrable group, which 
dictated the flow of capital and investment across many borders. Most recently, scholars such 
as Manuel Llorca-Jaña, Lopez-Morell and Juliette Levy (to name a few) have produced a number of 
especially significant publications on the role of financial intermediaries in Latin America. Llorca-
Jaña and Lopez-Morrell’s work has been essential for illuminating the role of London bankers Huth & 
Co.  and Rothschilds (respectively) in creating a global network which included Latin American 
markets and trades; while Levy’s work has highlighted the role of special financial players in inland 
markets, namely in the Yucatan. This paper aims to build on this previous work through an analysis of 
crucial network actors in Anglo-American merchant bank networks in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. To conduct a varied and general analysis, this paper will draw on the correspondence records 
of the Baring Brothers and N. M. Rothschilds, two of the most well-known and profitable London 
merchant banks of the period. Through this material, this study will present an analysis of British 
merchant-bank connectivity and the role of intermediaries in connecting merchant banks to distant 





  In the mid-eighteenth century, the Beekman family firm of New York, importers of dry 
goods from England and with numerous ties to the Caribbean, were at the centre of a growing 
transatlantic trading community. It was around this time that a prominent member of the family, 
William Beekman, a ships-captain, settled in Liverpool with the view to strengthening the firms 
business on that side of the Atlantic.1 This was achieved through meetings with manufacturers, 
building contacts in the local merchant community and relaying important information on this market 
back to the New York firm. The Beekmans were not the only firms sending individuals abroad to 
access markets, other firms such as Greg, Cunningham & Co. also sought to do the same by 
spreading firm partners or agents between Belfast, Liverpool and New York.2 As trade and 
subsequently finance of international trade grew to become even more complex, firms that could 
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afford to do so (and had the right personnel available) sent multiple individuals abroad to learn about 
new markets, network-build, coordinate firm activities and act as a conduit for information for the 
focal firm. Often referred to as agents, special resident agents, brokers and middle-men, these 
individuals provided the crucial service of intermediation for firms engaging in long-distance trade 
and finance (these individuals will be referred to as intermediaries from here).  
Another role that many of these intermediaries undertook was to advise on credit extension and debt 
recovery. This role became particularly central to the activities of merchant bankers of the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, such as N. M. Rothschild & Co., Baring Brothers, and W. & J. 
Brown & Co., whose businesses centred on the supply of finance to various international firms 
engaged in trade, mining, railways, canal building and a host of other pursuits on a global scale.3 
These firms built complex networks of clients in many distant locations, often securing trusted local 
correspondents or sending agents abroad to act as intermediaries in developing and monitoring their 
business interests.  
In recent decades, the literature on the complexity of business networks, and financial networks in 
particular, has expanded. Particularly after the global financial crisis of 2007-08, many have looked 
to the embeddedness of current global financial networks as a source of vulnerability.4 However, 
scholars of early global business are well aware that complex financial networks that crossed borders 
and interacted with multiple actors are nothing new. The proliferation of merchant banks in the early 
nineteenth century drew cities, industrial districts and regions together in complex credit and trade 
networks.5 Similar to global connectivity today, the role of intermediation in expanding global trade 
and finance networks in nineteenth century was crucial to international business but also created 
chains of vulnerability in which individual actors played a major role in business outcomes, both 
positive and negative. Crucially, in Latin America, access to financial tools and innovation such as 
credit and the establishment of early banks fuelled expansion in many industries such as agriculture, 
mining and railways.6  
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This article is thus an attempt to further understand the complex role of intermediaries in merchant 
bank network building between 1825 and 1850 in markets both distant and unfamiliar to the focal 
firm. . Using examples from the Latin American networks of prominent merchant banks, N. M. 
Rothschild and the Baring Brothers (in Mexico and Cuba specifically), this article will examine 
different types of intermediaries (those external and internal to the focal firm) and differing network 
stages (those which were well-developed and those which were in the initial stages of development). 
Access to trade and finance were especially important for these economies; in Mexico, a young 
financial system sought external access to capital to support industrial development, while in Cuba, a 
booming tobacco and coffee (later sugar) industry required access to markets outside the colonial 
metropole to send the incredible surplus of these goods.  While this article is far from a complete 
examination of the intricate webs woven by the numerous contacts of these merchant banks, it offers 
an important glimpse at some of the crucial links maintained by network actors which connected 
London-based merchant banks to distant markets, industries and players in international trade and 
finance. Critically, rather than focusing on the narrative of one merchant bank from the perspective of 
the London-based firms as many historians have already done so masterfully, this article aims to 
provide insights from the periphery of these firms in an attempt to unravel the complexity of their 
networks and the role of intermediaries within these networks.  
Intermediaries appeared in all forms and contexts but their purpose was generally the same: to act as 
a conduit of information and opportunity for the focal firm. 7 Use of intermediaries proved successful 
for a number of firms; however, abuses of trust, bad decision-making and similar behaviours that 
trickled back to the focal firm made entrusting the business of particular markets to individuals at 
times a costly practice.8 In markets unfamiliar to focal actor firms such as Rothschild and Barings, 
the use of a resident intermediary (sometimes referred to as a resident agent) was the only means 
through which that market and its potential was accessed.   
Through initial analysis of intermediaries operating on behalf of merchant bankers in various 
locations, a number of important research questions emerge. First, what were the backgrounds of 
these intermediaries and did this have an impact on the responsibilities they were granted by the focal 
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firm? Second, what were the various responsibilities of these individuals and to what extent did these 
intermediaries influence major business decisions on behalf of the firms they represented? Finally, 
how crucial were these individuals to the business of the merchant-banks in these locations and how 
easily could they be replaced?  
By investigating these research questions, this study addresses several gaps in the international 
business history literature. Much emphasis has been placed on merchant bankers of this period but 
less on the multitude of peripheral firms who extended their international reach or, on occasion, acted 
as a hindrance to expansion.9 Adding to the novelty of this study is the focus on Mexico and Cuba in 
the first half of the nineteenth century, an area and era less frequently explored within the context of 
international business history despite the importance of international trade and finance to these 
locations.10 This provides important insights into the role of international networks in developing and 
often turbulent economies. Particularly from a historical network perspective, emphasis has often 
been pointed towards central actors or wider network shape and structure11, the advancing literature 
suggests now is the time to take a longer look at components of these wider networks. Focus on the 
actions and behaviours of intermediaries allows a reorientation to the human factor in international 
business networks, which were certainly networks shaped by market conditions but also individual 
and group actions.  
 Methodology and Intermediary Literature 
The first half of the nineteenth century yielded some extraordinary circumstances for global 
trade and finance growth. Given the turbulence of this period it is a wonder that so many merchant 
banking houses with legacies into the twentieth century, and in some case twenty-first century, have 
their foundations in this period.12 The transatlantic business community in particular faced a number 
of crises over these decades (1819; 1825-26; 1837; 1847) as well as prolonged periods of depression, 
particularly after the Panic of 1837.13 Political changes also shifted opportunities and thus focal 
points for business expansion. The Napoleonic Wars, the end of slavery in the British colonies, the 
repeal of the East India Company’s charter (and the subsequent opening up of the Eastern trades) and 
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numerous independence movements (in particular, in Latin America) provided opportunities for new 
ventures as well as heightened levels of uncertainty.14   
Above all, this was a transitionary period, which caused numerous upheavals and failures in 
international trade and finance; however, for some who were able to reap the rewards brought by new 
opportunities and survive the consecutive crises, it was a period of expansion and network-building. 
This study examines intermediation as an off-shoot of a network approach, although the role of 
intermediary has also cropped up in many literatures on brokerage, transaction costs economics and 
agency.15 If one views networks as ‘structures of inter-firm relationships that emerge and evolve 
through continuous interactive processes’16 as described by Halinen and Tornroos, then the role of a 
firm or individual that links two distinct networks/firms becomes important for not only the firms but 
for the wider networks. Size, structure and potential growth is impacted by the existence of this 
bridge or as they will be referred to here, intermediary. 
The use of networks as a methodology within business history is certainly nothing new. Over the 
years, an impressive literature has developed exemplifying the ways in which network analysis can 
add to our understanding of evolving business relationships and performance in many different 
contexts.17 The network literature and its adaptation into business history research demonstrates the 
importance of individuals in business at both a domestic and international level; the crucial human 
factor. Aldo Musacchio and Ian Read have demonstrated the importance of the informal nature of 
networks to entrepreneurs in developing economies such as late nineteenth century Mexico.18 Others 
have examined business networks in leveraging a firm’s position, as strategy, as a way of transmitting 
information and as a way of connecting groups in society.19 These studies have illuminated the role 
of the network actor and how network membership can impact upon the business of the actor in 
various contexts and periods. Even within non-historical literature, there is precedent for taking a 
historical approach to network analysis.20 A network, when viewed positively as a set of links (with 
trusted associates) that encourage ongoing exchange, access to resources and mitigate risk, can be 
regarded as an essential apparatus through which firms engaged in long distance trade and finance.21 
Interaction within networks is governed by trust, which is built up by both longevity of relationship 
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and good reputation.22 Networks in this and many other contexts become both an aim and product of 
doing business, which accounts for the increasing presence of this theme in business history research.  
Despite the rising importance of social network theory in the business history literature, fewer studies 
have engaged in research that examines specific network roles. Most recently, Michael Aldous 
explored the presence of intermediaries in mid-nineteenth century Anglo-Indian trade in relation to 
transaction cost economic theory, an important contribution to the business history literature on 
networks and transnational trade.23 Aldous found that intermediaries were uniquely positioned to 
carry out a number of tasks, in particular the reduction of information asymmetry, which speaks to 
their persistence over time.24 Hugo van Driel’s study of the coffee trade similarly focused on the 
functions of middle-men in absorbing risk, relaying information and building expertise in a given 
trade.25 Van Driel’s focus on coffee trade demonstrated the need for intermediaries to have specific 
skills. Research into commission merchants operating in early nineteenth century demonstrate the 
need for muti-farious skillset that might involve dealing with raw commodities, manufactured goods 
and debt.26  
Beyond merchants, Juliette Levy has added to the literature on financial intermediation by exploring 
the role of notaries in the Yucatan as critical links between larger financial bodies and local 
business.27 Certainly, merchant-bankers, although involved in finance in many forms, also engaged in 
commodity trades, such as Barings in cotton and Rothschild in quicksilver. The spread of investment 
activities across industries and broad scope of business similarly required these firms to be able to 
choose from a catalogue of expert correspondents who could advise on these businesses.  
Importantly, work which has utilised the extensive Rothschilds archive, such as that of Alma Parra, 
Anamaría Calavera Vayá, Tristan Platt, Elain Penn and Miguel A. López-Morell and José M. 
O'Kean, have recognised the significance of agents and correspondents in Rothschild international 
business.28 These studies provide crucial understanding of the role of these individuals as players in 
dynamic trade and finance webs. However, there is an opportunity to explore further, through 
multiple lenses of networks, influence and decision-making, the impact of these individuals; drawing 
out comparisons within firms, locations and between competitors.      
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Thus, incredible scope remains for the exploration of intermediation in different firms, business 
communities and historical periods; particularly within the context of merchant banks, many of which 
have an impressive collection of surviving business documents and correspondence. This study 
utilises qualitative material in the form of correspondence available through several archives in 
England.29 These documents detail routine information such as the state of business or politics in a 
particular location, the timeline for repayments from other firms, predicted future opportunities and 
details of associates. The opinions offered by intermediaries (often referred to as agents in the 
accounts used) are of particular interest here, as are the details of how they conducted (and 
expanded/contracted) business and their input in periods of critical decision-making. Intermediaries 
were instilled with an enormous amount of trust and thus, their behaviour and performance abroad 
impinged greatly on the global activity of merchant banks. That said, while their activity has been 
recognised in a number of studies on merchant banks30, specific analysis of these individuals as 
crucial bridges within a much larger network has been somewhat underemphasised. As such, this 
study proposes a more focused examination of the role of intermediaries and global networks in early 
nineteenth century merchant bank activity. Through a networked approach, we have the opportunity 
to draw together histories of global connectedness, to show that aspects of globalisation and 
embeddedness so apparent in current discourse has deep historical roots, and by understanding these 
foundations we can better understand the directions globalisation has taken up to the present day.   
In the history of British merchant banks and related firms, this study pushes for a focus on the role of 
the individual in firm expansion and transformation. In terms of the geographic scope of the firm, 
areas to which they created links, when they created these links and how/if these links extended or 
contracted can say much about the dynamic networks of these firms. Mexico and Cuba, which will be 
the principal geographic focus of this article, present an interesting opportunity to test geographic 
mobility over time since each merchant banker had varying degrees of success in certain locations. 
Given the diversity of regions in Mexico, scholars have focused on numerous topics and the 
development of specific areas/trades.31  Cuba’s economic history has had a more focused literature 
which has explored the complexities of the plantation economy, especially the booming sugar 
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industry of the nineteenth century.32 While the merchant bankers focused on here had dealings in 
locations such as New York, Boston and New Orleans; it is interesting to see the ways in which they 
spread their networks through different port cities, inland markets, industrial regions and mining 
districts of Latin America. Of course, there are also bigger questions with regard to differences and 
similarities in strategy, policy and personnel that can perhaps only be answered partly here but it 
serves as the beginning of integrating historical narratives of almost legendary firms into much more 
complex webs and discover how they operated in a world that they helped make smaller.   
Merchant banking in the nineteenth century: Overview and Literature   
Numerous studies of merchant banks in the nineteenth century help to construct a picture of 
connectivity and integration on the early global economic stage. Many of these provide accurate 
representation of the complexity of networked relationships in this period without oversimplifying 
the nature of these firms and their business arrangements. That said, merchant banking business was 
varied and often difficult to classify and thus these firms continue to be a focus of research. Stanley 
Chapman wrote the first significant study that directly compared the development of merchant banks 
in this period.33 His overview of the structure, capabilities and activities of merchant banks, and N. 
M. Rothschild and the Baring Bros. in particular, highlight the importance of these firms in early 
global financial activity.  Other authors have provided significant surveys of the development of 
European banking, some starting from the late nineteenth century onwards and some reaching back 
into the eighteenth century and the age of early international trade financing.34   
Significant work by other scholars such as Jones. Roberts and Lisle-William furthered our 
understanding of merchant banks.35 These works have served to analyse the roots of merchant 
banking as a companion to international trading activities as well as explore many specific strategies 
and policies employed by merchant banks in various contexts. In terms of prominent merchant 
banking firms, the Baring Bros, N. M. Rothschild, Morgan, Grenfell & Co., and Schroders, have been 
the subject of monumental monographs, which detail their evolution over the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Work on the Rothschilds’ many branches is extensive and has led to more 
theoretically adventurous work being undertaken on their networking strategy.36 While more classic 
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studies, such as that of Herbert H. Kaplan, examines the development and expansion of N. M. 
Rothschild & Son, others take a specific view of strategy and important players in the wider 
Rothschild network.37 For instance, Lopez-Morell & O’Kean examined the firm in their Spanish 
operations and the efforts expended by the firm in establishing relationships there.38 In this study, the 
authors describe the importance of both internal networks (board, branches or agents) and external 
networks (correspondents & partners). Here, Lopez-Morell & O’Kean recognise the importance of 
intermediaries (or agents) in building networks, especially in regards to Rothschild while also 
emphasising the difficulty in entrusting decisions to individuals in distant locations.  
Similarly, Anamaría Calavera Vayá writes in detail about crucial agents conducting business on 
behalf of the Rothschilds in Madrid and Cuba demonstrating the importance of individuals such as 
Karl Scharfenberg who linked multiple locations to access markets and commodities, particularly 
Cuba and its many opportunities.39 Also exploring the Rothschilds’ activities in Latin America are 
the significant works by Lopez-Morell and Inés Roldan de Montaud which examine links to Mexico, 
Chile, Peru and Cuba.40 Adding to the theme of networks and the Rothschilds, Rainer Liedtke’s study 
of the Rothschild information network focuses on the role of agents in controlling the flow of 
information and decision-making on behalf of the central firm. Importantly, it examines aspects of 
trust, loyalty and reputation in aiding the Rothschilds in monitoring and controlling these agents.41 
Importantly and pertinent to the themes of this article, the impressive collection at the Rothschild 
Archive has produced a number of important articles by scholars who have utilised the records on 
various topics such as the Spanish agents, involvement in the quicksilver trade and the role of the 
agent in Mexico.42 This period in the history of N. M. Rothschild was remarkable for its network-
building and for this, the firm remained reliant on a number of crucial agents such as Karl 
Scharfenberg, Daniel Weisweiller and Lionel Davidson.43  
In building upon this literature, this study shall look at the role of Lionel Davidson and William de 
Drusina in N. M. Rothschild’s entry into Mexico and Francisco de Goyri’s role as a new intermediary 
to the firm in Havana. The work on the Barings firms has likewise been spread across time and space. 
Initially, Ralph W. Hidy’s work on the House of Baring in North America provided a detailed (if 
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dated) source.44 This has been revisited through the work of Orbell and Ziegler and most recently, 
Peter Austin, whose work provides a more analytical approach to activity and decision making of the 
firm from its early years; albeit from a much more centrally focused perspective.45 In the context of 
this study, the Baring’s networks in Mexico will be examined through their principal connections, 
Manning & Marshall, an agent inherited by the firm who had already established a sizable network in 
the region. It is the aim of this and future work to bring the periphery firms of these legendary 
merchant banks into clearer focus, exploring the role intermediaries, whether agents or 
correspondents, played in shaping merchant bank networks and directing strategy.  
Global activity and global networks  
  
Merchant banks were engaged in a number of activities on a global scale and to aid them in 
transacting at a distance, they possessed a diverse portfolio of correspondents. Merchandise was a 
common feature of their business alongside traditional merchant bank activities such as the finance of 
international trade and other credit advances.46 Government and state loans of varying quantities were 
also an aspect of merchant bank activities, albeit not as important as they would become in the later 
half of the nineteenth century. In the 1820s, these loans could be quite substantial and influential 
depending on the country; for example, Latin American governments frequently became indebted to 
British merchant banks (most defaulting on loans) which impacted upon the speed of their industrial 
and commercial development through the nineteenth century.47 The links many of the merchant 
banks possessed to Latin America were intimately tied to commerce, while some investment into 
other industries was occurring (mining for instance), it was not until later that the diversity of 
investment increased.48 The Barings, a prominent London merchant bank active in international trade 
and finance since the late eighteenth century, participated in many traditional merchant bank 
activities but have been recognised in particular for their reach into American markets as well as the 
astounding diversity of commercial activities and financing in which they were involved.49 N.M. 
Rothschild, who established a London house in the second decade of the nineteenth century, has also 
been recognised for activity in a range of international markets but in particular for the firm’s 
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involvement in the trade in bullion and other precious metals as well as government loans.50 These 
merchant banks along with a great number of others from the Anglo-American sphere (Brown 
Brothers, Prime, Ward & King, J. Schroders & Co. and George Peabody to name a few) influenced 
greatly the availability of credit in many parts of the world in this period. Merchant bankers often 
combined several different avenues of investment and banking to grow their influence, networks and 
profits.     
The different houses of Rothschild spread through significant capitals of finance, such as London (N. 
M. Rothschild), Frankfurt (M. A. von Rothschild & Söhne) and Paris (de Rothschild Frères), gave the 
firm a strong and stable base from which to extend their networks into multiple geographic regions 
and industries.51 Rothschilds’ extended agent network was comprised of predominantly family 
members or long-term employees/friends when and where possible. In situations where such an 
individual was not sent out, they utilised well-connected and experienced individuals, such as in the 
case of the temporary employment of William de Drusina and Francisco de Goyri. This strategy 
yielded varying results, some not always positive as in the case of key American markets within 
which they failed to embed themselves.52 Through their Latin American network, they entered many 
businesses, most notably government finance and procurement of precious metals. Beyond precious 
metals, the business of bill-broking and insurance for the Rothschild, and indeed any merchant bank, 
naturally connected them to various merchandise trades and inland industries. Rothschild found 
occasion to enter certain commercial trades such as tobacco in Cuba and cotton in New Orleans. 
Despite numerous crises in the first half of the nineteenth century and occasional financial 
difficulties, the Rothschild houses were able to persevere because of the diversity of investments and 
the stable support structure created by the European houses (who often bailed one another out when 
required).53  
Similarly, the Barings had a network of sister houses in Baltimore, London, Liverpool and New York 
that supported one another; they acted alongside agent houses in various key locations.54 Like the 
Rothschild, the Barings’ business varied, usually according to location. For example, their Liverpool 
house predominantly dealt with the bill-broking business related to the American trade while their 
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London house had a much greater involvement in government finance and liaisons with the Bank of 
England.55 As seen below, in Mexico, the business of the Barings was not particularly varied; being 
the creditors of the Mexican Government was a time-consuming task and left little room to venture 
into other industries in that particular country.  As with the Rothschild varied business pursuits, Latin 
American government finance was one element of a very large portfolio of investments controlled by 
the Baring houses and offered them access into wider markets as well as an opportunity to build 
networks and spread risk.    
While merchant banks had as their geographic base large European cities (and in some instances, 
North American cities), their networks allowed for their activities and sphere of influence to stretch 
well beyond these locations. Individuals, commonly referred to as special resident agents, can be 
viewed as footholds into particular locations, often acting as a springboard into local and regional 
markets.56 Much like the focal firms portfolio of correspondents, each resident agent also maintained 
an extensive collection of contacts, thus stretching the reach of the firm further through various 
chains of merchants, producers, mining engineers, mint owners etc. In addition to this, in locations 
where an official ‘agent’ was not present but the bank maintained business interests, often trusted 
correspondents took on the same function as resident agents.57 For instance, N.M. Rothschild 
operated in locations such as New York, New Orleans, Havana and Mexico City through the use of 
agents, each possessing varying levels of responsibility. Rothschild’s first close contact in Mexico, 
William Drusina, allowed Rothschild to access particular points in the Mexican economy, beginning 
first with the distribution of quicksilver to the mining districts and then to Mexican bonds, property 
and the export of dyestuffs and precious metals.58 The intimate relationships established with such 
individuals abroad leads one to reflect on how we might determine the geographical limits of the 
central firm. As networks expand, contract and transform over time, these distinctions become 
increasingly fluid and thus warrant an in-depth examination beyond central merchant bank activities 
or accounts to one that will take into account the complex web of relationships sustained by 
intermediaries and the correspondents of intermediaries.   
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In particular, the business of lending required constant and accurate monitoring of market conditions, 
opportunities and debtor firms. The extension of credit required the presence of a degree of trust that 
debts would be repaid, the greater the surety that an individual or firm had the capability (and 
willingness to pay back debts), the more lenient the credit terms and often, greater the sum loaned..59 
Merchant-banks were in the business of lending, more so than any other firm in the mercantile 
communities of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Information they required concerned 
not only market conditions but also the character of individuals within. From the seventeenth century, 
the concept of ‘credit’ became the glue which bound many firms transatlantically in relationships 
governed by obligation, reciprocity and debt.60  Creditworthiness, often synonymous with business 
reputation, was crucial in complex trade and finance networks where knowing one another and their 
history of dealings or alternatively, knowing someone who knows someone was the only means 
through which to judge the surety of transactions.61 Thus, networks acted as an important 
organisational form within informal commercial communities to ensure accountability and an 
informal code of conduct through which to monitor behaviour. Furthermore, intermediaries within 
these networks acted as gatekeepers to the focal firm for those wishing to obtain credit and monitors 
of those already in debt. However, despite the numerous benefits that networks accrued to its 
members in ideal situations where all members adhered to the ‘social contract’ governing member 
behaviour, in times of crises (or when fraudulent/bad business behaviour was prevalent), the 
embedded chains of firms spread uncertainty and vulnerability widely and rapidly.62  
Latin America in the nineteenth century  
Merchant bankers sought to extend their reach to numerous markets that offered lucrative 
opportunities for investment. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, certain areas of Latin 
America offered much promise to merchant banks looking to spread their investments and tap into 
emerging economies. The development of Latin America, especially following waves of 
independence, has been a topic of interest for scholars of imperialism and economic/business history. 
Latin America provides an important setting for the activity of these early merchant banks. The 
diversity of development in the region and the growth of many of these newly independent 
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economies presented merchant banks with ample opportunity to finance projects and firms across 
industries. Bulmer-Thomas’ general work on the economic history of Latin American countries 
demonstrates how the nineteenth century for many of these countries encompassed a period of both 
political turbulence and economic prosperity.63  
Most of Latin America had secured independence by the 1820s after years of European and extra-
European conflict and instability. By 1823, Central America had separated from Mexico, followed by 
Texas in 1836 and Yucatan in 1839.64 Both Mexico and Cuba experienced economic growth in the 
early nineteenth century, capitalising on their own combination of industries and connections to 
international markets. The first decades of the nineteenth century were most notable in terms of 
Mexican economic growth at 1.34 % from 1810-1830 and slowing to -0.32% in the two decades after 
that (1830-50). In Cuba, growth continued above the Latin American average at 1.00% from 1810-
1830 and 1.55% from 1830-1855, which can be attributed to the booming sugar and tobacco trades.65 
Despite instances of uneven growth and political instability, independence opened many avenues for 
the movement of goods and capital across borders.  The presence of Latin American economies has 
major players in a wider global economy of the nineteenth century has been illuminated by a number 
of important scholars.66 Most recently, scholars have made important strides towards revealing the 
interconnectivity between Great Britain and Latin America. The work of Graciela Iglesias-Rogers has 
highlighted numerous individuals who bound together the ‘Hispanic Anglosphere’.67 This research 
has exposed a multitude of links of varying qualities but clearly highlights the importance of 
commercial ties in this period.   
Certain locations such as Brazil, Chile and Peru have featured more prominently in the literature. 
That said, there is a burgeoning literature, which covers aspects of Mexico and Cuba’s development. 
Literature on the economic development of Mexico focuses on the development of port cities and 
mining districts in the period following independence (1820s); for example, John Mayo’s work on 
merchant activity on west coast.68 Much of the work on the early Mexican economy has focused on 
factors which impeded Mexican economic growth such as lack of credit, legal and political 
constraints.69 Perhaps a large part of this was the power wielded by foreign merchants and the 
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illiquidity of the government in the decades after independence. Historians of Mexican financial 
development have illuminated a number of crucial aspects of banking and credit in nineteenth century 
Mexico. Carlos Marichal points out the flurry of work that has been produced on Latin American 
banking recently, as many have come to recognise the region as neglected within the scope of 
financial history, propelled by the use of excellent sources made available at various archives.70 
Levy’s work on financial innovation through notaries in Yucatan has contributed greatly to our 
understanding on Mexican credit markets, albeit for a later period than that which is the focus of this 
study.71 Like Levy, a number of works have been produced which focus on Mexican economic and 
financial development in the latter half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, starting 
with Rippy’s work on British investment.72 Importantly, Rippy’s work demonstrates the variety of 
industries established in Latin America and the spread of investment through these; much as it was 
emerging in the earlier part of the nineteenth century.73  
Banking was one of the oldest industries in Latin America, often tied to European roots and 
providing a fundamental base through which other businesses could establish themselves by creating 
greater access to credit and financial tools.74 According to Marichal, banking in Mexico expanded 
from the 1820s, fuelled by burgeoning industries that required access to capital; for example, silver 
miners in the Zacatecas region attempted to set up a bank to support their activities there.75 Crucially 
for this study, the opening up of Mexico to European merchant banking interests occurred almost 
directly after independence, the first-movers being the Barings (Francis Baring even purchased land 
in Mexico as early as 1825) and Barclay, Herring, Richardson & Co.; however, banking facilities and 
foreign financial interests were present in Mexico from earlier on.76 Mexican independence did not 
bring about prosperity and growth to Mexico in the same way it had the United States for two 
reasons: first, Mexico lacked a developed or accessible inland transportation system to connect 
productive areas and second, Mexico was seen as having inefficient economic organisation, as a 
result of restrictive policies which impeded the mobility of labour and capital and constrained 
entrepreneurial activity.77  
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Thus Mexico provided the ideal opportunity for investment after independence with substantial 
natural resources and the need for financial innovation and access to credit.78 The first merchant 
bankers in Mexico centred their houses in Mexico City and Vera Cruz and became entrenched in 
politics as financiers of the Mexican government. Through a chain of intermediaries which included 
British consuls and agents, in particular the firm of Manning & Marshall, representative first of the 
Barclay firm and then of the Barings, negotiated a loan to the young Mexican government, financed 
by bondholders in London.79 In 1827, a year of widespread crisis, the Mexican government defaulted 
on this loan, severely damaging its reputation amongst Anglo-American merchant banking networks 
and the financial community in London. On numerous occasions, Manning & Marshall expressed 
their irritation with the Mexican Government to Barings as well as relayed conversations held with 
officials during the period of default (11 Aug 1827):  
 “We reminded him [the Mexican minister of finance] of the discredit which would accrue to this 
government if a house of your standing and character were break of its contact. We observe 
that.times had gone by when houses in Europe were so eager of obtaining agencies of these 
Republics. We very distinctly pointed out to him the serious results which would follow the 
nonpayment of their dividends.”80   
Manning & Marshall also comment on matters of government expenditure on the military (9 Oct 
1827):  
“As long as they continue to entertain their present foolish ideas of grandeur and the great 
expenditure it incurs and which is so incompatible with the institutions of a new Republican 
Government, we shall always be in hot water and surrounded by necessities…The President’s excuse 
for not adopting such salutary measures is the military position he is obliged to maintain on account 
of the non-recognition of their country by Spain.”81 
N. M. Rothschild’s activity in Mexico started later than the Barings, first through the mercury 
(referred to as quicksilver) and other merchandise trade in the 1830s, using William de Drusina and 
Lameyer & Co. as their correspondents/agents in Mexico City and Vera Cruz, respectively. 
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Rothschild used a well-developed European network to gain a foothold in particular trades and access 
particular regions (such as Latin America). For example, access to the quicksilver mines of Almaden 
in Spain and a monopoly over its supply gave Rothschild’s agents in Mexico an advantageous 
position in the silver and gold mining regions of the interior. Quicksilver was added to ground ore 
alongside salt and magistral allowing the silver to be procured from this mixture; thus making it 
essential part of the extraction process.82 Rothschild involvement in metal trades was well-established 
through the nineteenth century, exemplified by links to numerous mining regions and involvement in 
mints throughout Europe.83 In the first half of the century, a turbulent period for the Spanish crown 
led to outside bankers and investors attempting to take control of lucrative Spanish assets, one of 
these being the Almaden mercury auction. While a struggle ensued to retain control, the government 
eventually saw the benefits in co-opting an agent to sell mercury abroad; a task that fell first to Iñigo 
Ezpeleta, a merchant established in Bordeaux.84 N. M. Rothschild’s ties to Iñigo Ezpeleta, put them 
in an extremely advantageous position in this particular trade and in 1835, when the mercury business 
became buoyant again after a period of stagnation, the Rothschild were in prime position to havethe 
contract was passed along to them.85  
Given the need for quicksilver in the silver extraction process, the product was in high demand in the 
expanding silver mining districts of Mexico. On this end of the chain, Huth & Co. were particularly 
dominant, trading in mercury successfully from 1829. However, with the advantage of the contract, 
Rothschild was able to come to agreement with the rival London bankers to allow for distribution in 
Mexico while Huth & Co retained control over the Peruvian and Chilean markets. Thus, Rothschild 
started operations with the former agent of Huth & Co., Drusina, William & Co., who was charged 
with distributing mercury through branches in San Luis Potosi, Zacatecas, Guanajuato and Tamipco 
(together with Lameyer & co. in this location).86 Until the introduction of Davidson in 1843, 
Rothschild shared business with Huth & Co., giving them 40 per cent of the final net profits; an 
arrangement that Rothschild were keen to end.87    
In Cuba, development and industries differed from Mexico, being a Spanish colony which focused 
mainly on the production and export of agricultural products, namely coffee, tobacco and later, sugar. 
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A number of seminal works have been produced which explore the plantation economy of Cuba, in 
particular the development of sugar production on the island and its export through Havana.88 The 
growth of Cuba’s economy from the late eighteenth century can be attributed to the development of 
complex plantation system which advanced sugar production through the decades. Antonio 
Santamaria Garcia argues that the plantation, slaves and later, railroad were the core of the Cuban 
economy with the supply of sugar increasing 550% between 1760-1810.89 Another study by Roland 
Ely, emphasises the international links of the Cuban sugar economy, particularly to crucial North 
American commercial centres.90 At the end of the eighteenth century, Cuba benefitted greatly from 
the Haitian Revolution which provided access to slaves. By 1837, the first railway was constructed, 
financed by private capital and linking Havana to the Mantanzas region, one of the more lucrative 
plantation regions.91 To support the growing production of sugar, Spain allowed Cuban merchants 
and planters more freedom to trade and obtain finance. Still, Spain maintained a special relationship 
with Cuban plantations through contracts for tobacco supply.92  
The Spanish government relied on the collection of taxes from Cuba to finance government projects 
and therefore the sustainability of business there was of high importance to maintaining this source of 
revenue.93 As a result of civil war in Spain, the government held an enormous debt and were in need 
of funds, thus, Rothschild became lenders to the Spanish Government through intermediary, Daniel 
Weisweiller. The agent in Madrid, Karl Scharfenberg was sent to Havana in 1838 to operate there on 
behalf of  Rothschild and the Spanish government and although he left in 1840, he returned shortly 
after to handle the burgeoning tobacco business.94 For Cuba, the importance of intermediation was 
tied to both business and political interests and individuals who became key intermediaries for 
merchant banks, such as Francisco de Goyri, were often connected to both business and political 
circles.95 by the nineteenth century, Cuba’s economy was integrated into the world market, ahead of 
other Latin American countries. Spain’s loose grip on Cuba and the growing economy created a need 
for financial innovation and in particular banks as many, including the state, had been engaging in 
international borrowing for decades.    
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Cuba, and activity in Havana in particular, offer a different perspective on merchant bank 
involvement in Latin America. Unlike Mexico in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, 
Havana was not undergoing independence and did not experience the same turbulence brought about 
by changes in government. In fact, commercial reforms which began in Cuba in the eighteenth 
century, built a foundation upon which it became one of the principal sugar producing islands in the 
nineteenth century.96 However, because of its position as a colony, British merchant banks needed a 
local intermediary, even more so than in Mexico. Thus the business undertaken by merchant banks in 
Havana in the early nineteenth century, aided by local agents and correspondents, tapped into the 
lucrative trade in sugar and coffee as well as credit extension to firms based there and involved in 
these trades. From 1844, Rothschilds activities in Cuba centred on merchandise trades and sugar.  
This activity is revealed in the correspondence records of the Rothschilds, whose contacts 
Scharfenberg, Tolme & Co. and Francisco de Goyri, relayed information pertaining to the trade in 
these goods as well as political relations with Spain, who played a large role in governing the 
island.97 From the late 1820s, the Barings also had a number of clients in Havana and Mantanzas, 
most of whom were either sugar or coffee merchants; however, unlike the Rothschilds, it does not 
appear that the Barings possessed a Cuban agent.98 By the 1850s in Cuba, Schroders also emerged as 
an important merchant bank in Cuba and investor in Cuban infrastructure such as railway, with 
nearly 53 clients (second highest concentration of Schroders clients after Hamburg) including 
Scharfenberg, Tolme & Co., previously Rothschild’s agent.99 Although not covered here, this type of 
transfer of activity from one prominent merchant bank to another offers an opportunity to examine 
the role of networks in this transition.   
The reputation of Latin America deferred greatly from the established North American ports in which 
when Anglo-American merchant banks were active since the eighteenth century, in particular New 
York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and later, New Orleans. Merchant bankers were wary of conducting 
business with not only firms based there, but also governments. Yet, as mentioned above, Latin 
America’s expanding economies promised many new opportunities which included a new channel for 
short-term ‘uncovered’ credit business, introduction or expansion of new crops (coffee), heightened 
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demanded for other natural products such as dyestuffs in relation to the booming textiles industries, 
the growth of mining districts and the trade in quicksilver and new governments looking to lend 
money.100 Liedtke and Llorca-Jana noted the differences in the geographic spread of merchant 
bankers business, some being more limited than others.101 Certain Latin American activities of 
particular merchant bankers are well-known, certainly in respect to the Rothschilds in Brazil. 
However, there is still significant scope for delving back into the archives to pick apart the networks 
they possess there, in particular the role of individuals in facilitating network creation and 
maintenance. The following section will focus on the intermediaries of the Barings and Rothschild’s 
networks in Mexico and Havana.    
The Importance of Intermediaries   
Intermediaries are a necessary actor in many forms of networks because they bridge clusters, 
regions and other actors. While they bring many benefits to themselves and actors to which they are 
linked, they also possess an astounding amount of influence in the overall network structure and 
function. While the benefits of being a central actor in a larger network, much like the central 
merchant bank firms, can be quite explicit (for example, access to resources both tangible and 
intangible, established reputation and ability to spread risk), the benefits of the intermediary position 
within networks are more varied, given the dynamic nature of the role and the diversity of network 
structure.102 In instances where an actor creates a single bridge between two networks (for instance, 
between the core merchant banking network and a network of correspondents in the mining districts 
in Mexico), this actor becomes essential to ongoing transactions and information transmission 
between the two networks and can thus possess specialised capabilities useful to the central firm.103 
Therefore in situations where the merchant bank is reliant solely on this individual, the intermediary 
occupies quite an influential position in the network. Table 1 offers an outline of the intermediaries 
discussed in this study.    
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Source: Rothschild Archive London XI/38/76A; Rothschild Archive London XI/38/88A; Rothschild Archive 
London XI/38/125A; Barings Archive, ING, HC 4.5.2.3a; HC 4.5.2.6b; HC 4.5.2.33 
As seen in this table, only one of the intermediaries can be deemed as internal, meaning that they 
were sent by the merchant bank to establish themselves in a particular location; similar to the move 
undertaken by William Beekman in Liverpool and Waddell Cunningham in New York, mentioned 
above. Most are, however, European expatriates, which implies a pre-existing connection based on 
mutual ties, perhaps related to ethnicity; for example, the shared German ethnicity of Rothschild and 
Drusina.  
The resident agent, as mentioned above, has long been recognized as a crucial intermediary in many 
merchant bankers’ international networks.106 They possessed responsibilities only granted to trusted, 
known and (mostly) experienced individuals. They also received certain benefits from the central 
firm – a salary, shares, setting up costs, subsistence, etc. In some locations, merchant banks did not 
have these individuals, relying solely on correspondents or having a branch of their own business 
there; for example, the Browns, whose family members spread branches to critical British and 
American locations such as Liverpool and New York as well as having agents in places such as 
Boston and New Orleans.107 The necessity of intermediaries has often overshadowed the numerous 
negative consequences of such a relationship. This has long been recognised in the literature on 
agency.108 The principal-agent problem is one that applies in many respects to these early long 
distance trade and finance intermediary relationships. However, examining agency within the context 
of networks provides a more complex view. Intermediaries existed within a wider web of connections 
and their relationships governed their network position, especially when those connections became 
highly embedded as a result of duration of relationship, debt, reputation and a whole host of other 
relationship characteristics (referred to by Gulati and Srivastava as constrained agency).109   
When examining the Spanish networks of the Rothschilds, Lopez-Morrell and O’Kean constructed an 
internal and external network of contacts. Internal being agents/sister houses and external consisting 
of correspondents.110 However, the categorisation of these individuals as well as correspondents is 
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fluid, as personal relationships develop and change over time. The boundaries between internal and 
external networks become permeable if we consider how frequently they change, how often 
correspondents are made agents and vice versa, as was seen in the case of Francisco de Goyri who 
appears to have moved temporarily from correspondent to agent and back again; and thus why the 
term ‘intermediary’ has been chosen by the author. Keeping this in mind, while also applying Lopez-
Morrell and O’Kean’s idea of these network layers or hierarchy, highlights not only the extension and 
contraction of the network geographically and in terms of size, but also the movement between layers 
thus denoting interesting aspects of relationship progression, transformation and renegotiation over 
time. Figure 1 and 2 illustrate the internal (agents/intermediaries, in centre bold) and external 
(correspondents, second ring) networks of the Barings network in Mexico from 1825-1850 and 
Rothschilds’ early network in Mexico. However, an additional layer (outside second ring) beyond the 
external network could be added for correspondents who were linked to the merchant bank through 
the agent alone and did not correspond directly with the central firm.   
Figure 1. The Baring Brothers Mexican network (1825-1850)  
  




Figure 2. N. M. Rothschild’s Mexican network (1843-44) 
  
Source: Rothschild Archive London XI/38/76A; Rothschild Archive London XI/38/88A. 
Figure 3. Geographic representation of N. M. Rothschild-Lionel Davidson network in Mexico 
(created using Gephi) 
 
Source: Rothschild Archive London XI/38/76A. 
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Manning & Marshall (who was replaced by MacKintosh in 1842 to create Manning & 
MacKintosh) secured an extremely advantageous position for the Barings in Mexico, despite 
problematic relations with the Government. Through early network building with ministers and 
consuls, they fostered a reputation as the ‘ones to watch’ in the Mexican merchant community (Heath 
1993).111 Their activity also appears in the letters of Drusina to N. M. Rothschild in January of 1837, 
when he writes, 29: 
 
“Messr Baring Bros & Co. have for years received very heavy amounts of specie because their agents 
here, Manning & Marshall have unlimited authority to draw upon them whenever they consider the 
Exchange and time favourable, and make remittances when and as best they can.”112 (29 Jan 1837).  
   
As can be seen in Figure 1, through Manning & Marshall, the Barings were linked to a number of 
firms scattered throughout Mexico (primarily in port towns or mining districts). As seen in the 
correspondence detailed above, Manning & Marshall held an influential position in their relations 
with the various Ministers of Finance and similar government officials, a position bridged to the 
Barings through intermediation. . The Rothschilds entry into Mexico was much more incremental 
than the Barings and with far less involvement in the Mexican Government. Although, prior to 1843, 
they possessed a correspondent-agent in Mexico City, William de Drusina & Co.,, it was through 
Lionel Davidson, a special agent sent to Mexico City, which they attempted to network-build in that 
region and move the network internally by extending the familial connection of Davidson to that 
region. Drusina was the perfect initial springboard into Mexico for Rothschild’s firm, having arrived 
from Germany in the 1820s as part of the first German commercial house located there. Through his 
work for Huth & Co. initially in the region, Drusina gained the necessary experience and connections 
to operate knowledgeably and skilfully in Mexico.113 As detailed above, while Drusina was a crucial 
intermediary for the firm, he was not an agent in a formal sense, most obviously exemplified by the 
fact that he worked on the behalf of rival merchant bankers, specifically Huth & Co. and as 
mentioned, Rothschild was obliged to compensate the other London merchant bank a portion of the 
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profits Drusina’s agency brought them114. That said, prior to Davidson’s arrival Drusina possessed 
many of the same responsibilities as the later internally sourced intermediary. In relation to the above 
quote on the leniency granted to Manning & Marshall by the Barings, Drusina wrote, “If it should 
suit your needs to act upon the same principle, we could send you a constant succession of shipments 
of specie”115 (29 Jan1837). Drusina continues on to suggest that the risks in allowing the Mexican 
firm to draw greater amounts of credit from Rothschild would be limited. The following year, after 
the turbulence of the Panic of 1837, it is clear that Drusina’s firm are continually being urged to limit 
their activity. In response, Drusina writes:  
“we note that for the present you wish your credit to us for specie operations to stand as 
mentioned in your letter of 16 April and today we must only repeat that we will desist from 
all operations in specie on our joint account until the differences with France116 shall be 
settled as under the present circumstances we cannot make quite sure that we can cover our 
drafts against Specie placed in the Interior by the Packet immediately following that which 
advised the drafts. We do not wish that you should experience any disappointment in this 
respect. When trade resumes its usual course we trust we shall be able to operate upon a 
secure and mutually advantageous footing.”117  
It is clear from the letters of Drusina that his firm continually exercises caution, waits for instructions 
from Rothschild and does not overstep their responsibilities in the Mexican capital. The reason for 
the strict adherence to the ‘rules’ implemented by the focal firm might be the less embedded nature of 
their relationship. Drusina, while well-connected is external to the firm, maintaining an amicable 
relationship is as beneficual (perhaps more so) to Drusina as to Rothschild, particularly because of 
the access to finance. As argued by van Driel and Devos, this form of network relationship created a 
‘cooperative form of governance’; firms adhered to ‘rules’ because in doing so, they ensured 
themselves ongoing interaction with a well-positioned and well-connected firm. 118  The primary 
interest of the Rothschild firm in Mexico was the often mentioned specie trade; in particular, they 
sought access to the expanding silver mining regions of central Mexico (for example, Zacatecas, San 
Luis Potosi and Guanajuato, see map in Figure 3). It is not entirely clear why Rothschild decide to 
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bring in an internal intermediary to take on many of the responsibilities Drusina possessed but it 
appears highly likely that the reasoning was twofold. First, Rothschilds clearly wanted to expand 
their interests in the precious metals trade and had an advantageous position due to their involvement 
in the quicksilver trade Expanding the business would require an individual with more experience 
operating internationally and perhaps a more trusted relationship with the firm. Second, Rothschild 
had been transacting with Drusina for many years and perhaps, given the drive to expand the 
business, they saw the limits or barriers this relationship provided. It becomes clear from the later 
letters of Davidson, the relationship of Davidson to Rothschild was one which allocated Davidson 
much more freedom and influence in decision-making. This can be attributed to the closer social 
distance in the relationship between the focal firm and Davidson; familiarity in this and many similar 
relationships broke down barriers of formality which at times included strict adherence to codes of 
conduct (or rules).119  
When Davidson arrived in Mexico city in the summer of 1843, it was clear that it was the duty of 
Drusina to pass on the duties of intermediation by providing an induction into the Mexican business. 
Upon his arrival, Drusina wrote Rothschild to express their satisfaction with the hand-over:  
“We shall be happy to continue giving him all the information and assistance in our power, and we 
have expressed to him our readiness to offer such facilities as may be required for the purpose of 
rendering our intercourse with your much esteemed house at once important and advantageous.  He 
will himself submit to you the results of our conversations of the moment on topics of principal 
importance to you.”120 
This temporary triad relationship, as stated above, would allow Davidson to carry on the business 
with the required knowledge to make decisions on behalf of Rothschild, as Drusina had done. 
Meanwhile, Drusina would remain linked to the Rothschild by carrying on a much smaller 
merchandise trade business.121 While Davidson enjoyed the contacts of William de Drusina & Co., he 
was essentially starting from scratch when he arrived with only Drusina to make introductions and 
give advice pertinent to local economic activity. Thus, while one can see here the potential to replace 
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intermediaries in distant markets, the process was time-consuming and required access to resources, 
namely information. In situations where the intermediary needed to be replaced because of failure or 
bad business behaviour, this sort of induction process might not have been available to the focal firm.  
As outlined by Gould and Fernandez, the broker, which essentially equates to intermediary, possesses 
five main functions: coordinator, consultant, gatekeeper, representative and liaison.122 While the 
intermediaries discussed in this study can be seen to occupy all of these roles to some degree, in long-
distance trade and finance, access to accurate information and knowledge on market conditions was 
paramount.123 Thus the role of consultant was one which comes through most in the correspondence 
and where one can see the most evidence of intermediary decision-making. The following discussion 
will provide some examples of intermediary decision making in both the Rothschilds and Barings 
networks, particularly pertaining to critical decisions involving debt repayment and local business 
activity. In critical decisions, we see the most evidence of the intermediaries’ activity and influence. 
In instances where decisions are not time-sensitive, options are provided by the agent alongside a 
‘trusted’ opinion of which to pick. For example, the decision on where and how to set up an agent in 
Mexico (From Davidson to Rothschild, 26 Jul 1843):  
“These considerations have led me to the conclusion* that it would not be in your interest for me to 
establish myself here as an independent agent. But to conduct your business through a house like that 
of Drusina upon such a basis as I shall hereafter lay before you, and this for 2? Reason:  
1 A business confined to the city of Mexico must necessarily be so limited that it would not I 
think be worth your while  
2 Whilst on the other hand, a business conducted through correspondents in the Coast and in 
the interior, upon the plan I have been discussing with Mr. Drusina, might I think be carried on to my 
great advantage. But this would require such an intimate knowledge of the Country and of the 
people, that I consider that any stranger entering upon it by himself alone must necessarily mean 
great risks, nor could a man by remaining at that time in the country gain sufficient experience, 
unless during that time he were actually engaged in the trade.”  
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“*You will please bear in mind however that not having been in this place yet a week, what I write 
today are my first impressions, which it is very possible that a little experience may greatly 
modify.”124  
  
Here, Davidson initially advises N. M. Rothschild against setting up a resident agent in Mexico for 
the reasons above, giving a rather negative opinion of the place and availability of opportunity. He 
also includes the caveat that this is an initial observation, subject to change. Perhaps this was 
influenced by the observation that Drusina’s business had failed to expand in his time with the firm. 
However, this initial observation was either changed or dismissed by the focal firm since Davidson 
continues to pursue business through Mexico City.    
In instances where the agents were compelled to make decisions without consultation, justifications 
are provided after the decisions are made. In a number of instances, Manning & Marshall, given their 
long-term relationship with the government, make decisions on behalf of the Baring Brothers related 
to ongoing business with the State and manner of debt repayment:    
We take due note of your instructions and authorisation relative to the prospect of copper 
coin, respecting which we have had some conference with the Minister of Finance, but we 
fear we shall not be able to carry it into effect – for the only way we shall be induced to enter 
into business by the Government is if they pay us in cash immediately on the delivery of the 
amounts we might introduce into the country (2/3 May 1831).125  
In the following passage, Manning & Marshall argue that they enacted a plan to accept payment from 
Government in ANY form for the following reasons:  
1. The [role] returned to your lender protest would serve you no purpose.  
2. We know the state of the Treasury here where there is hardly cash enough to pay the troops  
3. We do not like to give the Minister the opportunity at present of consulting the Chambers as 
to how their payments should be made…as consultation would take many months.126  
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Exercising this type of initiative without consultation occurred not only because Manning & Marshall 
did not have the time to wait for a reply, which could take months, but because of the length of their 
experience with the Mexican government and their position in that local network. Since Manning & 
Marshall were an agency inherited by the Barings, they possessed a certain degree of seniority in 
their position. Thus, in this instance, the Barings would find it difficult to replace this intermediary 
should the relationship unravel. In certain situations, the intermediaries make decisions that are not 
acceptable to the central merchant bank firm, in which case, the intermediary provides justification 
after the fact. For example, Davidson was seen by the firm to rely too heavily on Drusina in his first 
few months in Mexico, giving him too large a percentage for his role as a commission merchant of 
Davidson.  
Related to this Davidson wrote (27 Nov 1843):   
Ever since my arrival my object has been to make myself as independent of others as 
possible, arrangements with Drusina are of a temporary nature. By means of these however I 
have been enjoying the full benefit of his experience to initiate me in all the details of the 
business – and by the apparent willingness with which I at first enticed with all his 
propositions, I fully conciliated his good will.127  
Davidson argues that he secured Drusina’s service on the best terms possible; however, if Rothschild 
disagrees with continuing this relationship, Davidson indicates that he should cut off all 
communication with Drusina, since he will not be pleased with new arrangement. Thus Rothschild 
was stuck here, Drusina being such an important contact in accessing the interior of Mexico and 
various knowledge resources, they have no choice but to go along with Davidson’s terms.   
The records of correspondence of Francisco de Goyri in Havana to N. M Rothschild offer an 
interesting comparative perspective and an example of the process undertaken when adding an 
intermediary to an established network. In this instance, it is clear that de Goyri had to meet not only 
with the approval of Rothschild but indeed of the agent already in place in Havana, Tolme; the 
satisfaction of both parties was necessary. Given that Tolme was experiencing hardships, Rothschild 
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needed to install someone else to handle matters in Havana. In response to the handing over of this 
responsibility, de Goyri writes (2 August 1837):  
It has afforded me pleasure that you are satisfied with Mr. Tolme having turned over to me 
such of your property as they held and I beg to assure you that in the management of the 
same, as well as of all business you may confide to me, I shall devote such attention to it as 
to merit also I hope the high satisfaction you are pleased to express as to the conduct of my 
friend, Mr Tolme.128  
Figure 4. Geographic representation of N. M. Rothschild correspondent network in Cuba (created 
using Gephi) 
 
Source: Rothschild Archive London XI/38/125A.  
 
Figure 4 details the geographic spread of Rothschild’s principal direct correspondent network through 
which they would have had access to numerous clients located throughout the island. In some 
instances, the wider network also provided insights, in a letter to Rothschild, Davidson praises the 
merits of Tolme, regarding de Goyri as ‘a man of a different stamp’ who leaves most of the 
responsibility of the business in the hands of Tolme.129 That said, it is clear from Goyri’s pedigree 
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why he was chosen to undertake this temporary role on behalf of Rothschild. Not only did he possess 
many crucial ties to the political elite in Spain, he was a well-known face on the board of the Banco 
Espanol de Cuba and commissioner of the Banco de San Fernando in Havana.130 In 1846, when 
Scharfenberg returned to Havana he went on to form Scharfenberg, Tolme & Co. and de Goyri was 
seemingly removed from the business (perhaps following the observations of Davidson). This 
demonstrates the difficult in placing a new external contact as a bridge into a well-established 
network, in this instance, it appear to be a process of trial and error.    
With so much responsibility in the hands of intermediaries such as Drusina, Davidson, Manning & 
Marshall and the various Cuban agents, what power did the central banking house have in controlling 
decisions made on the ground in these markets? Particularly as these firms expanded operations, 
further embedding themselves into the trading centres of the port cities and into the interior through 
ownership of mining companies and mints, they became essential, perhaps irreplaceable, network 
actors. The untangling of relations and winding up of business would certainly have been a lengthy 
process and thus, the level of insubordination tolerated must come into question. Situations where a 
network linked to the focal firm was already established, such as the case of Rothschild in Cuba, 
allowed for more flexibility on the part of the central merchant bank firm, since they were less reliant 
on one link into that region. In other networks, intermediary replacement required a transitionary 
period, aided by the resources of the former intermediary. What can also be observed in these 
relationships is that social distance between focal firm and intermediary or pre-eminence in local 
networks greatly influenced the freedom of decision-making for intermediaries and influence on the 
focal firm. In terms of avoiding agency problems, it is clear that in these and multiple other cases 
(Rothschilds’ New York agent August Belmont, for example), agency problems were at times 
unavoidable. However, the firms did their best to safeguard themselves against bad business practice 
by communicating their wishes clearly and often, picking trusted associates and relying on agents to 
monitor each other as seen in the example of Davidson and Goyri. Additionally, the intermediaries 
obtained many advantages from being associated with reputable British merchant banks and thus, 
benefited from maintaining a good and amicable relationship.  
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Final Conclusions and future implications  
Unlike Austin’s in-depth study of strategy and the Baring Brothers, this paper focuses on peripheral 
firms in the merchant-bankers international network. As integral players in wider merchant-bank 
activity, these intermediaries provide interesting insights into the role of networks and individuals in 
the expansion and contraction of international business. In returning to the original research 
questions, it is clear that intermediaries possessed varied backgrounds and pre-existing relationships 
with the focal firms; at times, sourced internally through familial or long-standing friendship 
connections (Davidson), externally inherited based on reputation (Manning & Marshall), external 
with ties to similar firms (Drusina) or entirely external (de Goyri). These differing types of 
relationships had the power to govern the relationship dynamics based on longevity of prior 
relationship and reputational standing. Those with larger business interests outside of the focal 
banking firm would have a stake in protecting these as well.   
Intermediaries also had multiple functions that were utilised to different degrees depending on nature 
of business and trust (often dictated by relationship longevity or reputation). They had the capabilities 
to expand networks in locations previously unknown to the merchant banks and through their 
presence in distant locations had access to important information pertaining to both economic and 
political conditions. The provision of this information and advice from the intermediary was used by 
the focal firm in order to make decisions regarding the direction of business. As has been 
demonstrated, the advantageous position of the intermediary allowed them a certain degree of 
independence in their activity in these locations and while often they made decisions for the benefit 
of the central firm, they wielded a substantial amount of power in that relationship, especially in 
instances where they occupy the sole link between a given market or region and the central merchant 
bank firm. They also acted as liaisons, representatives and gate-keepers for the merchant banks.131 
They found clients, extended finance and chased up debts when necessary.132 The ability of the focal 
firm to replace these intermediaries was dictated by a number of factors: the nature of the relationship 
with the prior intermediary, the intermediary’s position within local networks and the focal firm’s 
pre-existing familiarity with the market. To replace an intermediary, the focal firm required access to 
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a flexible, open local network and the replacement intermediary to already possess knowledge of the 
intended market or have access to crucial knowledge resources. Either way, the process was time-
consuming and costly. Given the complexity and necessity of intermediary’s position in international 
trade and finance networks, this study serves to highlight the importance of these actors in the global 
activity of early merchant banks.  
The cases presented in this article represent a fraction of examples of intermediaries in the 
Rothschild, Barings and other merchant-bank firms extensive networks and thus there is great scope 
for research into a host of comparative examples illuminating further network dynamics and 
strategies of some of the largest nineteenth century merchant banks. Thus, many questions arise 
which further investigation into intermediaries could aid in answering; for example, how the 
networks actually functioned from a holistic perspective or if the focal firm managed different 
networks in different ways depending upon location or network actors. Unravelling these complex 
networks would serve to illuminate interesting aspects of the entrepreneurial activity of network 
intermediaries, allow one to compare the effectiveness of intermediary activity in similar contexts 
and observe change over time in different merchant bank networks. Also important are the instances 
of failure amongst the community of merchant-bankers; for example, in instances where merchant 
banks failed, what was the role of their wider network? Or in instances where intermediaries failed, 
what action was taken by the focal firm? Moving forward, it is the intent of this study to provide a 
foundation on which further examples from different geographical contexts and climates can build in 
order to construct a more complete and representative depiction of Anglo-American merchant-bank 
activity. This will serve to demonstrate that merchant banks of the early nineteenth century created a 
small and interlinked world which was heavily intertwined and vulnerable to change not unlike the 
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